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Bradley: In Re Dillon

ARTICLES
IN RE DILLON: PRIMA FACIE
OBVIOUSNESS OF CHEMICAL
CLAIMS
By GREGORY

I.

L.

BRADLEY*

INTRODUCTION

Over the last forty years the courts and the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") have applied conflicting prima facie
obviousness standards to chemical claims. This conflict came
to a head in In re Dillon. 1
Dillon's claims had been rejected as obvious by the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences. On appeal, a panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed2 on the
basis that the Board had used an incorrect standard for prima
facie obviousness. The panel held that a prima facie case of
obviousness is not made unless the claimed invention is
"structurally similar"3 to the prior art reference, and there
exists some suggestion in the prior art that the claimed
invention will have the same or a similar utility as that
discovered by the applicant.'
©1991 Gregory L. Bradley. B.S.M.E. 1988, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. 1991,
University of Pittsburgh School of Law. The author is an associate at the Intellectual
Property law firm of Willian Brinks Olds Hofer Gilson & Lione in Chicago, Illinois. The
author wishes to thank Professor Pamela Samuelson of the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law and Jeffrey Duncan and John Crook of Willian Brinks Olds Hofer
Gilson & Lione for their advice and suggestions when writing this article. This paper
presents the current views of the author and does not necessarily represent those of
Willian Brinks Olds Hofer Gilson & Lione.
1. 919 F.2d 688, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
2. In re Dillon, 892 F.2d 1554, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
3. "Structural similarity" is a term used to describe chemical compounds that have
very similar molecular structures. Chemical homologs and isomers are prime
examples of structurally similar compounds. See In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 457,458 n.
7, 195 U.S.P.Q. 426, 428 n. 7 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("A 'homologous series' is a series of
compounds whose structures differ regularly by the successive addition of the same
chemical group .... Different compounds having the same molecular formula are called
isomers. They contain the same numbers of the same kinds of atoms, but the atoms
are attached to each other in different ways.")
4. This standard will be referred to as the Dillon dissent standard.

263

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2

264

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:263

The PTO petitioned for rehearing and suggested rehearing
en banc on February 12, 1990. This petition was approved and,
on November 9,1990, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit issued an opinion reversing the earlier panel decision by
a nine to three margin. 6 Circuit Judge Lourie, writing for the
Dillon majority, formulated a standard for prima facie
obviousness different from that announced in the prior Dillon
decision. Under this standard, a chemical compound or
composition that is "structurally similar" to the prior art, where
the prior art provides motivation to invent the claimed compound
or composition, is prima facie obvious. This prima facie case of
obviousness may be rebutted by test data showing (1) that the
claimed compound or composition possesses unexpectedly
improved properties over the prior art or properties not actually
possessed by the prior art, (2) that the prior art provides no
motivation to make the "structurally similar" compound or
composition, or (3) any other relevant argument. 8
This standard was severely criticized by the Dillon dissent
as being both contrary to the weight of precedent and the
reincarnation of a disfavored prima facie obviousness standard
of earlier years - structurally similar chemical compounds are
prima facie obvious. 7 Instead, the dissent advocated using the
prima facie obviousness standard announced in the earlier
Dillon decision.
Despite the dissent's assertions, the Dillon standard for
prima facie obviousness has a sound base in precedent and
promotes the integrity of chemical compound patents. The
soundness of the Dillon standard, however, is not as apparent with
respect to chemical composition and process claims and, quite
probably, will increase chemical patent prosecution expenses.
After reviewing the facts of the Dillon case, this paper
will illustrate, by analysis of prior caselaw, that Dillon has not
5. Judges Archer, Markey and Michel issued a concurring opinion in which
they joined the majority in its formulation of the prima facie obviousness standard.
6. This standard will be referred to as the Dillon standard.
7. This standard will be referred to as the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural
obviousness. "Structural obviousness· is a 'presumption of obviousness' (older term
for prima facie obviousness) based on the structural similarity of claimed and prior
art subject matter, and the assumption in chemistry that structurally similar
compounds have similar properties. This 'presumption' could be rebutted by evidence
showing that the prior art compound did not possess the property possessed by the
claimed compound. See In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122, 60 U.S.P.Q. 544 (C.C.P.A. 1944); In
re Henze, 181 F.2d 196, 85 U.S.P.Q. 261 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
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revived the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural obviousness.
Rather, Dillon will be revealed as having molded many years
of sometimes inconsistent precedent into a coherent standard
for prima facie obviousness. Subsequently, the legitimacy of the
Dillon standard with respect to chemical compound,
composition and process claims will be considered. s Finally, the
effect of Dillon on patent prosecution costs, and other policy
considerations, will be discussed.
II.

PRIMA FACIE OBVIOUSNESS

At the outset, it must be emphasized that Dillon sets
forth a standard for prima facie obviousness, not one for the
patentability requirement of nonobviousness. The two concepts
are legally distinct. As explained in In re Piasecki,B the seminal
case explaining prima facie obviousness~ "[t]he concept of
prima facie obviousness in ex parte patent examination is
but a procedural mechanism to allocate in an orderly way
the burdens of going forward and of persuasion as between the
examiner and the applicant. "10 Thus, if the examiner produces
factual evidence tending to prove the obviousness of the
claimed invention, the prima facie obviousness showing has
been made and the burden to rebut that showing falls upon the
applicant. If adequate rebuttal evidence is produced, the
holding of prima facie obviousness, being but a legal inference
from previously uncontradicted evidence, is overcome.
"Regardless of whether the prima facie case could have been
characterized as strong or weak, the examiner must consider
all the evidence anew. "11
The final determination of obviousness, then, will rest
upon consideration of all the relevant facts in evidence,
including the objective factors considered in Graham,12
uninfluenced by the examiner's earlier showing of a prima
facie case. However, the failure on the applicant's part to
8. For the sake of clarity, compound and composition claims will be treated
separately even though compound claims are technically a subgroup of composition
claims.
9. 745 F.2d 1468,223 U.S.P.Q. 785 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
10. [d. at 1471-72, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 787-88.
11. [d. at 1472,23 U.S.P.Q. at 788 (emphasis added).
12. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (Court announced objective
factors to be considered in the determination of non obviousness, including 'commercial
success,' 'long-felt need,' and 'peer recognition.').
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produce evidence sufficient to rebut the prima facie case will
result in a final rejection of the applicant's claimed invention. 13
III. THE DILLON CASE
Dillon had applied for a patent on a composition comprising
hydrocarbon fuel and tetra-orthoester 14 compounds. Dillon
claimed that the inclusion of the tetra-orthoester compounds
in the hydrocarbon fuel composition would result in reduced
particulate emissions during fuel combustion (i.e. reduced
pollution).
The combination of hydrocarbon fuel and tetra-orthoester
compounds was not disclosed in the prior art, and the use of
tetra-orthoesters to reduce particulate emissions was not
suggested in the prior art. However, the prior art did disclose
the use oftri-orthoester16 compounds in hydrocarbon fuels for
the purpose of dewatering the fuels. Furthermore, additional
prior art indicated that tri-orthoesters and tetra-orthoesters
were chemically equivalent for use as water scavengers in
hydraulic fluids.
The PTO rejected Dillon's claims on the basis that the
prior art references made them prima facie obvious. Since
Dillon could not show some unexpected advantage or
superiority of her claimed tetra-orthoester fuel compositions
as compared with tri-orthoester fuel compositions, the PTO
finally rejected Dillon's claims as being unpatentable for
obviousness.
The Dillon court affirmed the rejection of Dillon's claims.
The court believed that the prior art had established "a
sufficiently close relationship between the tri-orthoesters and
tetra-orthoesters ... in the fuel oil art to create an expectation
that hydrocarbon fuel compositions containing the tetra-esters
would have similar properties ... to like compositions
containing the tri-esters, and to provide the motivation to
13. It should be emphasized that the procedural mechanism of prima facie
obviousness is used for all patent claims, not just for chemical claims.
14. A tetra-orthoester is a carbon atom to which four -OR groups are bonded. In
the chemical formula, 0 represents an oxygen atom and R represents a monovalent
organic radical comprising 1 to 20 carbon atoms.
15. A tri-orthoester compound differs from a tetra-orthoester compound in that
it has three -OR groups bonded to a central carbon atom.
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make such new compositions. "16 The "motivation" provided by
the prior art, together with the structural similarity between
the claimed and prior art compositions, resulted in a showing
of prima facie obviousness that Dillon was unable to rebut.
IV. DILLON MAJORITY'S STANDARD IS CONSISTENT
WITH PRIOR CASELAW
The Dillon dissent strenuously argued that the majority
was reviving the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural obviousness.
The Dillon majority strongly denied the dissent's assertion and
declared that its prima facie obviousness standard was based
on precedent and long-established principles of patent law.
Most likely, this interpretive conflict between the Dillon
majority and dissent is a result of the prima facie obviousness
standard's inconsistent development in the caselaw over the
last forty years.
Beginning with Hass-Henze and continuing into the
present, the standard for prima facie obviousness has
alternately shifted towards, and then away from, structural
obviousness. Since a study of every case cited in the Dillon
decision is exhausting,17 only a few of the most important
cases will be analyzed here. This analysis shows that Dillon has
a solid basis in precedent.
A.

ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL OBVIOUSNESS

It seems proper to begin the analysis with the cases where
it all began: Hass and Henze. IS While these cases were actually
decided almost six years apart, they are usually considered
together when discussing the origins of structural obviousness.

In Henze, the applicant claimed a compound that was the
adjacent homolog of a prior art compound. Due to the similar
chemical structures of homologs and the "close relationship the
physical and chemical properties of one member of a series
bears to adjacent members,"19 the claimed compound was
16. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 692, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1900-01 (emphasis added).
17. The Dillon. dissent alone cited approximately forty-two cases.
18. In. re Hass, 141 F:2d 122, 60 U.S.P.Q. 544 (C.C.P.A. 1944); In. re Henze, 181
F.2d 196, 85 U.S.P.Q. 261 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
19. Henze, 181 F.2d at 201, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 205.
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rejected. The Henze court indicated that the structural
obviousness of the claimed compound could be rebutted by
evidence proving that the "claimed compound possesses
unobvious or unexpected beneficial properties not actually
possessed by the prior art homologue."2o.21
Thus, under Hass-Henze, a compound is prima facie obvious
ifit is structurally similar to a prior art compound. According
to Hass-Henze, this prima facie showing may only be rebutted
in one way: evidence showing that the prior art does not
actually possess the properties possessed by the claimed
compound. So viewed, it is readily apparent that the HassHenze doctrine and the Dillon standard, while similar, are
not identical. Specifically, in order for a prima facie case to be
made under Dillon, more than structural similarity must be
shown - the prior art must also provide motivation to the
inventor to make the claimed invention.
Furthermore, Dillon expands the categories of evidence
permitted to rebut the prima facie case. In addition to the
rebuttal evidence permitted under Hass-Henze/ 2 Dillon allows
for rebuttal by: 1) evidence proving that the claimed compound
possesses unexpectedly improved properties over the prior
art, and 2) evidence showing that the prior art gives no
motivation to make what appear to be obvious changes. Thus
there are some major differences between the two standards;
Dillon does not revive the Hass-Henze doctrine, it merely uses
the doctrine as a foundation upon which to build its own prima
facie obviousness standard.
B.

REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

In re Papesch 23 and In re ChUpp24 are important precedent,
for each originated a specific category of rebuttal evidence
embraced by the Dillon standard for prima facie obviousness.
20.Id.
21. In re Hass announced the same standard for prima facie obviousness as
Henze: M[I]n order to be patentable. novel members of a homologous series of chemical
compounds must possess some unobvious or unexpected beneficial properties not
possessed by a homologous compound disclosed in the prior art." Hass. 141 F.2d at
125.60 U.S.P.Q. at 547.
22. Evidence showing that the claimed compound possesses unobvious or
unexpected properties not actually possessed by the prior art.
23. 315 F.2d 381. 137 U.S.P.Q. 42 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
24. 816 F.2d 643. 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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In Papesch, the claimed compound was a homolog of the
prior art compound - the claimed and prior art subject matter
were structurally similar. The examiner initially rejected the
claims since they were obvious homologs of the claimed
compounds. The applicant responded by filing an affidavit
reporting that the claimed compound "is an active antiinflammatory agent while the prior art compound is completely
inactive in that respect."26 The examiner finally rejected the
claims, stating that the affidavit was not relevant as evidence
to rebut the initial rejection. The only issue before the court on
appeal was whether the examiner was required to entertain the
evidence of nonobviousness presented in the affidavit.
The Papesch court was concerned with whether the affidavit
contained legitimate evidence of the type sufficient to rebut a
prima facie obviousness case. The court believed that the
"failure to take into consideration the biological or
pharmaceutical property of the compounds as antiinflammatory agents ... [was a] fundamental error of law."26
The court reasoned that "[a]n assumed similarity based on a
comparison of [chemical compound formulae] must give way to
evidence that the assumption is erroneous."27 In so holding,
Papesch is support for the Dillon standard's allowance of
rebuttal evidence showing that the prior art does not actually
possess the property possessed by the claimed invention.
Even though Papesch is irrelevant to the issue of the
requirements for a prima facie obviousness case, the Dillon
dissent quotes a passage of the decision to the effect that, in
order for a prima facie obviousness case to be made, the prior
art must "at least to a degree ... [disclose] the same desired
property relied on for patentability in the new compound. "28
While this passage may be dicta, it will be addressed because
the Dillon dissent partly relies on it for its formulation of the
prima facie obviousness standard.
When read in context with the court's discussion preceding
it, the quoted passage does not contradict the Dillon standard.
The court's discussion was centered on the relationship between
25. Papesch, 315 F.2d at 383, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 45.
26. Id. at 391, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 51.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 392,137 U.S.P.Q. at 52 (emphasis omitted). Note that the Dillon dissent
standard is a rewording of this passage.
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prima facie obviousness and the ultimate question of patentability.
The Papesch court, quoting In re Henze, said: "[p]atentability is not
resolved conclusively even where unexpected or unobvious
beneficial properties are established to exist in novel members of
a homologous series over prior art members, as the circumstances
may require a consideration of other factors.29 That the prior art
disclosed "at least to a degree ... the same desired property relied
on for patentability in the new compound" is mentioned by the
Papesch court as being one of the 'other factors' bearing on the
obviousness of a compound. 30 Since these 'other factors' may be
considered in determining the ultimate question of nonobviousness
and, hence, of patentability, they have no bearing on the
determination of the prima facie obviousness case - prima facie
obviousness and patentability are two distinct legal concepts. As
the Dillon majority said in response to the dissent's assertion,
"Papesch indeed stated that a compound and all of its properties
are inseparable and must be considered in the determination of
obviousness. We heartily agree and intend not to retreat from
Papesch one inch. "31
In ChUpp,32 the applicant claimed a compound that was
structurally similar (a homolog) to a prior art compound. Both
the claimed and prior art compounds displayed herbicidal
activity. The examiner concluded that the prior art compound
rendered the claimed compound prima facie obvious. The
applicant attempted to rebut the prima facie case by submitting
undisputed test data showing that the claimed compound
possessed at least five times the level of herbicidal activity as did
the prior art compound. The examiner, and later the Board of
Patent Appeals, rejected the claims on the basis that the
applicant's rebuttal evidence was insufficient to rebut the prima
facie case.
The Chupp court strongly disagreed with the Board: "Evidence
that a compound is unexpectedly superior in one of a spectrum of
common properties, as here, can be enough to rebut a prima
facie case of obviousness ... based on structural similarities."33
29. Papesch, 315 F.2d at 392, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 52, quoting In re Henze, 181
F.2d 196,201,85 U.S.P.Q. 261, 264·65 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
30.Id.
31. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 697,16 U.S.P.Q. at 1905.
32. 816 F.2d 643, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
33. Chupp, 816 F.2d at 646, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1439. See also In re Murch, 464 F.2d
1051, 175 U.S.P.Q. 89 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Proof that claimed compound had unexpectedly
improved weld line toughness as compared to structurally similar prior art compound
held sufficient evidence to rebut a prima facie obviousness case).
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The inclusion of "unexpectedly superior properties" as
allowable rebuttal evidence illustrates, again, that the Dillon
standard is consistent with prior caselaw. The Dillon dissent's
assertion that the Hass-Henze doctrine is being revived is
incorrect, especially in view of the expanded categories of
rebuttal evidence permitted under the Dillon standard. At
most, the Dillon majority is guilty of taking the Hass-Henze
doctrine and improving it. Realistically, Dillon is a refined
culmination of occasionally inconsistent caselaw and thought
on "chemical obviousness."
C.

DILLON MOTIVATION REQUIREMENT

The basis for the Dillon standard's motivation requirement
may be found in In re Mod,3' a case factually very similar to the
Dillon case, and In re Stemniski. 36
In Mod, a homolog of a prior art compound was claimed. The
claimed compound possessed antimicrobial properties, whereas
the prior art compound disclosed only insecticidal properties.
Due to the structural similarity of the claimed and prior art
compounds and the belief that this close similarity would
suggest to an inventor the making of the claimed compound, the
Mod court determined the compounds to be prima facie obvious.
The Mod opinion sets forth the two elements required for
prima facie obviousness under the Dillon standard: structural
similarity between the claimed and prior art subject matter, and
motivation in the prior art to make the claimed invention. The
Mod court explained that it had "not relied on so-called structural
obviousness of the claimed compounds alone in support of its
conclusions .... Indeed, the examiner thought the compounds
of the claims 'would be expected to possess the same properties'
as [the prior art reference] discloses ....36 Thus, Mod specifically
rejected the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural obviousness and
also required, as Dillon now does, the element of motivation to
create a p,:ima facie obviousness case.
The Dillon dissent attempted to distinguish Mod on the
basis that it was not relevant to the determination of a prima
34. 408 F.2d 1055, 161 U.S.P.Q. 281 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
35. 444 F.2d 581,170 U.S.P.Q. 343 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
36. Mod, 408 F.2d at 1056, 161 U.S.P.Q. at 283.
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facie case. While Mod did not explicitly refer to a prima facie
obviousness issue, a fair reading of the decision shows that
impliedly the Mod court was considering a prima facie
obviousness case. For example, Mod quot~s the In re Henze
decision as indicating that the "burden is on the applicant to
show that the claimed compound possesses ... unexpected
beneficial properties not actually possessed by a prior art
homolog. 37 Since prima facie obviousness is a burden-allocating
device between the examiner and applicant, and the Mod
court, as stated in the above-quoted passage, was questioning
whether the applicant carried his burden, the Mod court could
not have been discussing anything but a prima facie case
when it made its decision. Furthermore, the last passage of the
Mod decision shows the interplay between the burdens of
proof and rebuttal in a prima facie case: "[T]here is no evidence
here, however, to contradict the conclusion that the present
compounds are obvious insecticides ... and thus have been
effectively placed in the public domain by [the prior art
reference] who provides adequate motivation to those of
ordinary skill to make them. "38 The terms 'conclusion' and
'contradict' are direct references to the showing of a prima facie
obviousness case and evidence required to rebut that showing,
respectively.
In Stemniski,39 an applicant claimed compounds having
antioxidantal properties that were structurally similar to
prior art compounds. The examiner, utilizing the Hass-Henze
doctrine, held that a prima facie case of obviousness was
established based on the structural similarity between the
claimed and prior art compounds. The applicant neither
attempted to rebut the prima facie obviousness case with
evidence establishing that the claimed compounds possessed
properties different from those actually possessed by the prior
art compounds, nor did he attempt to establish that the claimed
compounds in fact possessed improved properties over the
prior art compounds. 40 Needless to say, the examiner finally
rejected all the claims on the basis of obviousness.
On appeal, the applicant argued that the prior art
references provided no motivation to invent the claimed
37.Id.
38. Id. at 1057,161 U.S.P.Q. at 283.
39. 444 F.2d 581,170 U.S.P.Q. 343 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
40. One should note that these categories ofrebuttal evidence are identical to
the ones permitted under the Dillon standard.
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compound. Not only did the prior art not disclose antioxidant
effectiveness as a utility, the prior art did not disclose any
utility whatsoever for the compounds. In other words, the
applicant was asking, 'how can a prima facie obviousness case
be made when the prior art provides no logical reason to make
the claimed invention?'
The Stemniski court was impressed with the applicant's
argument:
Where the prior art reference neither
discloses nor suggests a utility for certain
described compounds, why should it be said
that a reference makes obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art an isomer, homolog
or analog of related structure, when that
mythical, but intensely practical, person
knows of no 'practical' reason to make the
reference compounds, much less any
structurally related compounds? How can
there be obviousness of structure ... when
no apparent purpose or result is to be
achieved, no reason or motivation to be
satisfied, upon modifying the reference
compounds'structure?4!
Ultimately, the Stemniski court held that an applicant is
entitled to a patent "where, as here, the prior art does not
disclose or suggest any usefulness for the compounds it
describes and the applicant does describe a usefulness
conforming with statutory requirements for closely related
but novel compounds he discloses. "42
While Stemniski strongly asserts that motivation is to be
considered in the examiner's analysis, it does not definitely
state where in the procedural make-up of the analysis
motivation is to be considered. In other words, is motivation
required in order for a prima facie obviousness case to be
made or is motivation (or lack thereof) only to be considered as
rebuttal evidence to the prima facie obviousness case? This
confusion is documented in a number of passages in the
Stemniski opinion. The Court itself admits that:
41. Stemniski, 444 F.2d at 586,170 U.S.P.Q. at 347 (emphasis added).
42. [d. at 587,170 U.S.P.Q. at 348.
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[I]t is not an easy matter to determine
whether we have before us a case in which
the evidence adduced by the patent office to
establish a prima facie case of obviousness
is inadequate ab initio or whether the
greater error lies in the failure to consider
appellant's discovery of a new ... usefulness
for the claimed compounds as adequate
rebuttal evidence of that prima facie case in
a situation where, as here, the ... prior art
neither discloses nor renders obvious a
usefulness for the compounds it describes. 43
The court, however, fails to state explicitly to which of the
above situations the case pertains.
The Dillon majority appears to have been somewhat
confused by the analysis in Stemniski. After reviewing the
Dillon standard, one will notice that there are motivation
'elements' in both the requirements for a prima facie
obviousness case and in the types of evidence permitted to rebut
a prima facie obviousness case. A passage from Dillon will shed
some light on what the majority believed to be the proper
"position" for the motivation element in the prima facie
obviousness procedural device: "Stemniski, rather than
destroying the established practice of rejecting closely-related
compounds as prima facie obvious, qualified it by holding that
a presumption [of obviousness] is not created when the
reference compound is so lacking in any utility that there is no
motivation to make close relatives."«·Thus, thepillon majority
obviously thought that the Stemniski motivation element was
meant as an added requirement for prima facie obviousness.
In light of the Dillon majority's interpretation, one could
infer that the Dillon standard's motivation requirement is
only unfulfilled when the prior art discloses no utility.
Nevertheless, Dillon should not be construed in this manner.
The number of prior art references, especially prior art patents,
that disclose no utility for its subject matter will, and should,
be very limited. (A patent disclosing no utility for the invention
therein should be invalid.) If this is, in fact, how the Dillon
43. Id. at 585,170 U.S.P.Q. at 347.
44. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 697, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1904-05 (emphasis added).
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majority is construing the motivation requirement, the Dillon
standard would be almost identical to the Hass-Henze doctrine
of structural obviousness, the only difference between the two
being the expanded categories of rebuttal evidence permitted
by the Dillon standard.
Nevertheless, a quote from Dillon indicates the majority's
belief that the motivation requirement's application would
not be limited to those instances when the prior art disclosed
no utility: "Properties ... are relevant to the creation of a prima
facie case in the sense of affecting the motivation of a researcher
to make compounds closely related to or suggested by a prior
ar t compoun d .... "45

D.

MOTIVATION AS A CATEGORY OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

An additional consideration remains with respect to the
motivation requirement, namely the reason for what appears
to be two motivation elements within the Dillon standard. If,
as previously stated, the Dillon majority interpreted the
motivation element as being an added requirement for prima
facie obviousness, why, then, does a motivation element appear
as a category of rebuttal evidence in the Dillon standard?
While the Dillon majority did not discuss the reason for this
apparent inconsistency, it may be explained as follows. After
initial review of an applicant's patent application, the examiner
has the burden of providing factual evidence in support of his
prima facie obviousness determination. The examiner may,
under the Dillon stan"dard, support his prima facie
determination by showing that prior art references, structurally
similar to the claimed invention, provide motivation for the
applicant to make the claimed invention. The applicant may
submit to the examiner's finding of structural similarity, but
he may not agree with the examiner's motivation
determination. The applicant, in this case, would then argue
that the prior art does not provide motivation for a likely
inventor to produce the claimed invention. That argument
would be permissible rebuttal evidence under the Dillon
standard. 46 The Dillon majority realized that this argument
would arise under its standard and they made provision for it
45. [d., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1905.

46. This argument would not be permissible rebuttal evidence under the Hass·
Henze doctrine of structural obviousness.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2

276

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:263

by including a 'motivation category' in permissible rebuttal
evidence.
V.

ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL CLAIMS

Before analyzing the soundness of the Dillon standard as
applied to chemical claims, a few important points must first
be introduced. First, as previously noted: 7 it is assumed in both
chemistry and patent law that structurally similar chemical
compounds will have similar physical and chemical properties. 48
Second, in any analysis under the patent laws, a chemical
compound and its properties are indivisible. While the chemical
formula "may serve in a claim to identify what is being
patented. The thing that is patented is not the formula but the
compound identified by it. "49 Finally, the scope of patent
protection differs between compound, composition, and process
patents. The scope of protection for compound and composition
patents is not limited to the disclosed use of the compound or
composition. Rather, the patent protects the disclosed use and
all other properties/uses of the compound or composition. On
the other hand, the scope of a process patent is limited to the
use claimed for the compound or composition; patent protection
is not granted to the underlying compound or composition.
As can be seen, compound and composition patents are more
desirable than process patents since they offer an extended
range of protection. The above-stated "rules" are helpful in
understanding the consequences of Dillon.
Applying the "rules" to different examples of chemical
claims will help to illustrate the impact of the Dillon standard
and to determine its legitimacy in various practical
applications. This analysis will begin with an example of a
compound claim and will then address examples of composition
and process claims.
A.

COMPOUND CLAIMS

Let us suppose that A discovers a compound X that is
useful as rat poison. Prior art compound Y is a homolog of X
(i.e., it is structurally similar to X) and is disclosed as being an
47. See supra note 8.

48. This doctrine will be referred to as the "common properties- assumption.
49. Papesch, 315 F.2d at 391, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 51.
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anti-viral agent. Under the Dillon dissent standard,60 X would
not be prima facie obvious since there is no suggestion in the
prior art that X would be useful as rat poison. On the other
hand, the Dillon standard would find X to be prima facie
obvious. Since X and Yare structurally similar, there is a
presumption they will have similar properties. A, being of
'ordinary skill in the art,' would be motivated to make a
compound similar to Y in the hopes that the new compound
would also be harmful to organisms (albeit larger ones). A
could rebut the prima facie case against X by showing either
that Y was not a rat poison or that X was a far superior rat
poison than Y.
Two scenarios immediately present themselves. In scenario
one, Y is not a rat poison or, ifit is, it is a relatively ineffective
one. In this case, both the Dillon and Dillon dissent standards
produce the same results. X is patentable. This result is good.
A has advanced the useful arts by discovering the unknown rat
poison, X.
In scenario two, Y is a fairly strong rat poison. Under the
Dillon standard, X is not patentable - A cannot show that X's
rat poison property is unexpectedly superior to Y's. In contrast,
X would be patentable under the Dillon dissent standard,
since there was no suggestion in the prior art that a compound
structurally similar to Y would be a useful rat poison. This is
bad. Y is a rat poison, even though that use was not disclosed
in the patent. In patent law, though, it is the compound, and
all of its inherent properties, that is patented. By granting a
patent to A on X, the Dillon dissent would be taking "obvious"
compound X out of the public domain.
In this second scenario, X and Y had similar properties.
Since structurally similar compounds are assumed by those
'skilled in the art' to have similar properties, and X and Y did
in fact possess such properties, what "invention" deserving a
patent was there in making compound X?61 Furthermore, let us
not forget that compound Y's patentee has an exclusive right
to Y and its properties and uses. Do we not undermine the scope
ofY's patent protection by allowing X to be patented? Looking
at it another way, how many properties do X and Y have in
50. See pp. 1·2 for the Dillon dissent standard.
51. If you say 'the unobvious use of previously unknown, but obvious, compound
X as a rat poison,' you are correct, but will have to wait until the discussion of process
claims.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2

278

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:263

common? So far, we know only of one similar use - rat poison.
Since structurally similar compounds are assumed to have
similar properties, isn't it possible that X and Y share many
common properties? Suppose A knew that X was an anti-viral
agent and wanted to produce and use X as such. A would be
prohibited from doing so due to the patent on structurally
similar compound Y.
By placing the burden on the applicant to rebut the
"common properties" assumption of structural similar
compounds, the Dillon standard prevents the following
detrimental results from occurring in chemical compound
prosecution: diminution of the public domain, undermining of
patent protection, and issuance of unwarranted patents.
Importantly, those applicants truly deserving of a patent for
their claimed compounds (i.e., those able to rebut the prima
facie obviousness case with evidence of unexpected superior
properties, etc.) are rewarded for their efforts under Dillon.

B.

COMPOSITION CLAIMS

The analysis of composition claims follows much the same
pattern as that of compound claims. In order to analyze a
"real-world" situation, let us use the composition claim at
issue in Dillon as our example. Recalling the Dillon facts,
Dillon claimed a composition comprising a hydrocarbon fuel and
a tetra-orthoester for use as a particulate emission reducer
during fuel combustion. The prior art disclosed a composition
comprising a hydrocarbon fuel and a tri-orthoester for use as
a dewatering agent, but did not suggest a use as a particulate
emission reducer. Tri- and tetra-orthoesters are structurally
similar compounds and the prior art disclosed the chemical
equivalence of the two compounds. Therefore, the "common
properties" assumption appeared justified.
As we know, the Dillon court found the claimed composition
prima facie obvious. Dillon did not rebut the prima facie
showing and the claim was rejected for obviousness. The Dillon
dissent, however, would not have found the claimed composition
prima facie obvious since the prior art did not suggest the
use of tetra-orthoesters as particulate emission reducers.
Presumably, the claimed composition would have been
patentable under the Dillon dissent standard.
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For the same reasons as discussed in the compound claim
example, the Dillon dissent result would be incorrect. Since triorthoesters were known as being dewatering agents in
hydrocarbon fuel compositions, it would thus be obvious, under
the common properties assumption, that tetra-orthoesters
were also useful as dewatering agents. However, granting a
patent to Dillon on the claimed composition would give her
unwarranted protection for use of tetra-orthoesters as
dewatering agents. It is irrelevant that her composition was
only claimed as being useful for particulate emission reduction
since a compound or composition claim may not be limited to
a specific use.
While the result under the Dillon standard appears
legitimate with respect to the specific composition claim in issue
in that case, the Dillon standard must be carefully applied to
composition claims in general.
The Dillon standard is primarily based on the "common
properties" assumption. This assumption is useful when only
one substance (i.e., a chemical compound) is being compared
against prior art for a prima facie obviousness determination.
However, when two or more substances are claimed together
(i.e., a chemical composition claim) the "common properties"
assumption is not as legitimate. A simple example will
illustrate this idea: "When two chemical elements, such as
sodium and chlorine, combine chemically to form sodium
chloride, the resulting product has none of the physical or
chemical characteristics of the elements from which it was
formed. "62 Thus, it is extremely difficult to predict the properties
of a chemical composition from the individual properties of one
of the composition's constituents.
The above-stated "exception" to the common properties
assumption appears to seriously undermine the legitimacy of
the Dillon standard as applied to chemical composition claims.
Nevertheless, Dillon, as stated previously, will remain
legitimate with respect to composition claims if applied
carefully.
Referring once again to the Dillon facts, we will discover
that the common properties assumption is still valid in that
52. A. W. Deller, 3 PATENT CLAIMS 39 (2d ed. 1971).
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case. The prior art disclosed a composition of hydrocarbon
fuel and tri-orthoesters and the claimed composition was
comprised of hydrocarbon fuel and tetra-orthoesters.
Comparing the prior art and the claim, we see that in both cases
structurally similar compounds are combined with hydrocarbon
fuel. Using a double common properties approach, we can
reason that since tri- and tetra-orthoesters should have
common properties, they should react with hydrocarbon fuel in
a like manner so that the resulting compositions have similar
properties.
On the other hand, had the Dillon prior art only disclosed
a composition of hydraulic fluid and tri-orthoesters, it does not
appear that the common properties assumption, and thus the
prima facie obviousness showing, would be valid. Since the
prior art did not disclose what properties or use would result
from a composition of hydrocarbon fuel and tri-orthoesters, how
would an examiner be able to predict with any certainty the use
of a composition comprising hydrocarbon fuel and compounds
(tetra-orthoesters) structurally similar to tri-orthoesters? It is
reasonable to assume that the structurally similar compounds
(tri- and tetra-orthoesters) would react quite differently with
hydraulic fluids and hydrocarbon fuel, with different properties
being the result. In this case, there would be no prima facie
obviousness.
Strict Dillon adherents may suggest that the burden be
placed upon the applicant to show that the common properties
assumption is inapplicable. This would not be a correct
interpretation of Dillon, for the Dillon standard of prima facie
obviousness is based on the accuracy of the common properties
assumption. The above suggestion would, in fact, create a
new and different standard for prima facie obviousness placing the entire burden on the applicant to prove the
patentability of his invention. Regardless of the patent policy
considerations affected by this new standard, it would appear
to run afoul of §102's grant of an affirmative right to a patent. 53
C.

PROCESS CLAIMS

The analysis of process claims follows a much different
route than that of compound and composition claims. In Dillon,
53. 35 U.S.C. §102 (1984) (MA person shall be entitled to a patent unless· .... ")
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Dillon had claimed a process of reducing particulate emissions
from hydrocarbon fuel combustion, comprising combusting a
composition of tetra-orthoesters and hydrocarbon fuel. The
Dillon court did not consider the patentability of the process
claims because, for technical reasons, they were not considered
by the Board of Patent Appeals. 64 Regardless, the application
of the Dillon standard to a process claiming a new use for a
compound or composition structurally similar to a prior art
compound or composition is not legitimate.
Consider again the compound claim example and the
question raised therein concerning inventor A's actual
invention. Ns patentable invention was not compound X for use
as a rat poison; compound X was "obvious" and one cannot
obtain a compound or composition patent limited to a certain
use. Instead, Ns invention was the unobvious use of previously
unknown, but obvious, compound X as a rat poison.
Likewise, Dillon's true invention was the use of the
unknown, but obvious, composition of tetra-orthoester and
hydrocarbon fuel as a particulate emission reducer. Assuming
that the process prior art was similar in scope to the
composition prior art referred to in Dillon, application of the
Dillon standard would result in Dillon's process claim being
found prima facie obvious. 66 Dillon would be required to produce
evidence proving that her process was new and unobvious,
even though the use was not disclosed in the prior art.
Importantly, the current patent statutes permit new and
unobvious uses to be claimed, and patented, as processes. 35
U.S.C. §lOl states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor .... "
Process is defined as meaning any "process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material."66 Therein lies the solution
to the problem concerning how to protect inventors discovering
new and unobvious uses of obvious compounds or compositions:
grant them process patents. This idea has been advocated
before:
54. See Dillon, 919 F.2d at 694-95, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1903.
55. The analysis used in the composition claim example would be identical,
except for the fact that processes, instead of compositions, would be compared.
56. 35 U.S.C. §100(b) (1984).
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It is basic to the grant of a patent that the
scope of a patent should not exceed the scope
of the invention ... To say that a person who
has discovered a new use for a structurally
obvious compound, which compound would
not have been entitled to any patent
protection absent the new use, should
receive a patent on the compound itself is to
extend the patent monopoly far beyond the
reason for its existence. We. think that the
purposes of the patent law will be
adequately served if patents on compounds
which are structurally obvious from the
prior art are limited to method patents
directed to the new and useful characteristic
or property which is the essence of the
discovery or invention. 67

This solution promotes two basic patent policies: it rewards
inventors for the discovery of new uses for obvious or known art
and, since process patents are limited in scope to the disclosed
process, the inventor is not given a patent greater in scope then
his invention. 68
VI.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Dillon requires the submission of test data as evidence to
rebut a prima facie case. This requirement will further increase
the costs of patent prosecution. Even though the extra burden
Dillon places upon applicants will promote the integrity of
chemical compound patents, and composition patents in the
correct situation, is it desirable to devise a burden-allocating
standard that increases costs to applicants? Will the benefit of
"better" patents outweigh the "cost" to our patent system of
applicants with limited resources possibly being foreclosed
from patent prosecution due to cost alone? Judge Johnson,
writing for the In re Henze court in 1950, hinted at this concern
when discussing the availability to the applicant of rebuttal
evidence: " ... [I]n the absence of such data, the assignee of
applicant's patent application, the Parke, Davis Company,
might reasonably be expected to have the resources to conduct
57. Mon8anto Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 790-91,164 U.S.P.Q.
556, 566 (E.n. Pa. 1970).
58. Or, in other words, the public domain is not unjustifiably diminished.
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such tests as would be required. "69 This quote brings two
thoughts to mind. First, Judge Johnson believed, in 1950,
that the requirement of rebuttal test evidence might be too
costly for some individual applicants to bear alone. If Judge
Johnson could accept that possibility then, should we be overly
concerned now? Second, Judge Johnson thought that the
applicant's assignee would have sufficient resources to perform
the required tests if needed. This statement, combined with the
notion that a large proportion of patent applications are backed
by companies with sufficient funds to see the prosecution
through to the end, suggests that the concern for individual
applicants would be easily outweighed by the benefits the
Dillon standard offers.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Dillon standard has a strong basis in precedent and
does not strictly revive the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural
obviousness. Any discrepancy between Dillon and earlier
caselaw may be explained by the inconsistent development of
the caselaw on chemical obviousness over the years.
With respect to compound claims, and composition claims
in particular situations, the Dillon standard will promote the
integrity of chemical patents and prevent the unjustified
erosion of the public domain. However, since the patent statutes
specifically permit new and unobvious uses of old or obvious
compounds or compositions to be patented, the Dillon standard
should not be applied to process claims.
Finally, the Dillon standard's requirement of test data
will increase the costs of patent prosecution, possibly with
the effect of foreclosing the entry of individual applicants, or
small companies, with limited resources into the patent process.
While this is an unfortunate "cost" to be borne, it appears
that it will be outweighed by the benefits the Dillon standard
will provide to our patent system.

59. Henze, 181 F.2d at 201,85 U.S.P.Q. at 265.
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